In the Matter of The New and Used Motor Vehicle Dealer\u27s License, Dick and Lavonne Noren, dba Central R.V. Sales : Reply Brief of Respondent-Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
In the Matter of The New and Used Motor Vehicle
Dealer's License, Dick and Lavonne Noren, dba
Central R.V. Sales : Reply Brief of Respondent-
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
David M. Bown; Attorney for Petitioner-Respondent;
Robert B. Hansen; Mark K. Buchi; Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, State v. Noren, No. 16521 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1779
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF U'l'AH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
The New and Used Motor 
Vehicle Dealer's License, 
DICK and LAVONNE NOREN, dba 
Central R.V. Sales 
,• 
. ·. 
Case No. 165211• ·, ·:· 
'j ;_ ' 
~.<i· 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLANT 1\DMINIS!I'l!Q.'lrtl!lt 
UTAH STATE MOTOR VEHICLE BUSINESS 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
HONORABLE ERNEST F. BALDWIN .PRESI~qlc. ' .•. ·.;w. , ...... ~ 
. : ·. ~~- :>\} 
______________ ;..._,;._...,_.""-_,_ ,.>. ·" 
DAVID M. Bm'ffl 
3007 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Attorney for Petitioner-
Respondent Dick and Lavonne Noren, 
dba Central R.V. Sales 
~ ~ ' j --~. 
'\;-·I·,,,: 
'·' \. •;' . 
ROBERT B. HANSEN' • ~·.• 
Attorney Gl:mer4i. · · 
Attorneys 
Appellant 
the Utah State 
Business Administ 
F~l 
M4Y- 2 1980 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
The New and Used Motor 
Vehicle Dealer's License, 
DICK and LAVONNE NOREN, dba 
central R.V. Sales 
Case No. 16521 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 
UTAH STATE MOTOR VEHICLE BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE ERNEST F. BALDWIN PRESIDING 
DAVID M. BOl-IN 
3007 South west Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
Attorney for Petitioner-
Respondent Dick and Lavonne Noren, 
dba Central R.V. Sales 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
MARK K. BUCHI 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent-
Appellant Administrator of 
the Utah State Motor Vehicle 
Business Administration 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT Page 
POINT I: THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN ENACTING UTAH 
CODE ANN. §77-35-17, WAS DISTINCT FROM 
THE PURPOSE OF UTAH CODE ANN. §77-35-17.5, 
AND SHOULD BE GIVEN A SEPARATE AND 
DISTINCT APPLICATION AND OPERATION . . . . 1 
POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY HEARING 
THIS MATTER COMPLETELY DE NOVO, BY 
EXCLUDING RESPONDENTS' PRIOR CONVICTIONS, 
AND BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE RECORD 
CREATED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY 14 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
American Smelting v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
16 Utah 2d 147, 397 P.2d 67 (1966) .... 8 
Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Central Weber Sevier Improvement 
District, 4 Utah 2d 105, 287 P.2d 884 (1955) . . . . . 16 
Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public Service Cornrn., 
98 Utah 431, 100 P.2d 552 (1940) 16 
Donahue v. Warner Bros., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954) 8 
Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching, 
18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963, Rehearlng, 18 Utah 2d 
276, 421 P. 2d 504 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Hakki v. Faux, 16 Utah 2d 132, 396 P. 2d 876 (1964) 
In Re Peterson's Estate, 22 N.D. 480, 134 N.W. 751 
(1912) at 763 . . . . . · · · · 
In Re Phillips, 17 Cal.2d 55, 109 P.2d 344 (1941) 
Loder v. ~lunicipal Court for S.D. Judicial District, 
17 Cal.3d 859,553 P.2d 624 (1976) . · · · · · · · · · 
Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners, 
34 Cal.2d 62, 206 P.2d 1085 (1949) 
(i) 
14,16 
15 
8,9,10, 
11,12,13 
. 12,13 
8,9,10, 
11,12,13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
peterson v. Livestock Commission, 120 Mont. 140, 181 
P.2d 152 (1947) ........... . 
Patt v. Nevada State Board of Accountancy, 
93 Nev. 548, 571 P.2d lOS (1977) .... 
State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) 
State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 35~ 64 P.2d 229 (1936) 
State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941) 
United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 1, 
238 P.2d 1132 (1951) .... 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. §41-3-8 
Utah Code Ann. §41-3-26 
Utah Code Ann. §41-3-27 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-17 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-17.5 
Utah Code Ann. §78-24-9 
SECONDARY SOURCES CITED 
Expungement of Criminal Convictions in Kansas: 
A Necessary Tool, 13 Washburn L.H., 93,94 
Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of 
Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 
1966 \\'ash. L.Q. 147,149. . ...... . 
Legal Rights of the Convicted, Kerper & Kerper (1974) 
(ii) 
Page 
16 
12113 
1, 2, 31 
41516 
11 
141 
15116 
16 
11117 
11,17 
14 
1, 213, 
415,61 
719112 
3, 6, 71 
9,17 
11 
2 
2 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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The New and Used Motor 
Vehicle Dealer's License, 
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Central R. V. Sales 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN ENACTING 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-35-17, WAS DISTINCT 
FROM THE PURPOSE OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§77-35-17.5, AND SHOULD BE GIVEN A 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT APPLICATION AND 
OPERATION. 
Respondents' brief states that Utah Code Ann. §77-35-17 
(hereinafter §77-35-17) is an "expungement" statute which is in-
tended to restore "the criminal offender to his status quo ante 
thereby removing all evidence and the very existence of the prior 
conviction." In partial support for this proposition, counsel 
cites to the language used by Justice Maughn in State v. Chambers, 
53 3 P . 2 d 8 7 6 (Utah 19 7 5) : 
The word "expunge" properly describes a 
phvsical act, not a legal one. However, in rela-
ti;n to 77-35-17, it has become fastened in our law 
by decision and practice as descriptive.of what the 
court can do under that statute. In thls sense, lt 
is expressive of councel, revoke, set aside. 
533 P.2d at 878. 
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Respondents continue by comparing Justice Maughn 1 s langu 
in Chambers to that of various noted authorities in their descr: 
tions of what effect expungement has on convicted parties 1 reco: 
Respondents claim them to be identical. But, a closer analysis 
of these comparisons reveals a sharp contrast rather than a sirr.· 
ilarity between the two. Chambers and respondents 1 authorities 
describe different events. 
For their comparison, respondents cite the following def· 
initions: "the word expungement means to erase. The purpose o' 
expungement statutes is to erase a criminal record as if it nev; 
happened in the first place," Legal Rights of the Convicted, 
Kerper & Kerper (1974); "expunge" means "to obliterate or to rna: 
void and of no effect," Expungement of Criminal Convictions in 
Kansas: A Necessary Rehabilitative Tool, 13 Washburn L.H., 93,~· 
"It is rather a process of erasing the legal event of a 
conviction or adjudication," Goug'1, The :Cxpungement of Adjudica· 
tion Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Stat 
19 6 6 vi ash. L. Q. 14 7, 14 9. 
Appellant notes a distinction between these definitions 
"expungement," cited to the court by respondents, and the actua 
effect of §77-35-17. This distinction is demonstrated through 
the choice of words selected by Justice Maughn in the majori~ 
opinion in Chambers. In essence, the majority says that when• 
(the Utah Supreme Court) use the word "expunge," "in this sense 
it is expressive of cancel, revoke, set aside." Chambers at 8' 
The appellant suggests that the above language by the court v:ao 
- 2 -
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in effect saying: "Yes, we realize that §77-35-17 is often referred 
to as an 'expungement' statute, for lack of a better short title, 
but when this court uses the word 'expunge' in reference to 
§77-35-17, it will only be 'expressive of cancel, revoke, set 
aside.'" Id. at 878. 
The contrast between respondents' authorities and the 
language of this court in Chambers, demonstrates that respondents 
are defining a "pure" expungement situation for which §77-35-17.5 
was created, whereas, §77-35-17, the statute under which respondents 
proceeded, does something different and does not purport to apply 
to a "pure" expungement situation. 
Appellant's rationale is clearly borne out in Chambers 
by the majority's language which precedes the above quoted passage: 
These two statutes are mutually exclusive. 
Section 77-35-17.5 does not purport to amend or 
repeal 77-35-17. It is apparent that each deals 
with a different situation. 
* * * * 
The record shows a confusion of both statutes 
in the initiation of this matter; . . Proceeding 
under this statute the court cannot seal the record, 
restrict its inspection, nor bring into operation 
circumstances which would allow a response to in-
inquiries relating to a conviction of crime, as 
thouoh such conviction had never occurred. The 
court can terminate the sentence, set aside a de-
fendant's plea of guilty, the conviction, dismiss 
the action, and discharge the defendant. 
533 P.2d at 878 (emphasis added). 
Clearly, the court recognized confusion in the application 
o~ these two statutes and clarified that §77-35-17 was more limited 
~~ scope in what type of relief a court may grant proceeding under 
it. In deciding Chambers, this court refrained from using those 
- 3 -
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"common buzz words of expungement" which respondents would ha•. 
this court use in defining §77-35-17. There is a clear absen~ 
of such "buzz words" as "obliterate," "erase," and "as if it 
never happened in the first place." 
Respondents urge the court to return Mr. Noren "to his 
status quo ante, thereby removing all evidence and the very exi 
ence of the prior conviction," but, even respondents cite the 
very language from Chambers which denies that this may happen 
under §77-35-17: 
Proceeding under this statute the court cannot 
seal the record, restrict its inspection, nor bring 
into operation circumstances which would allow 
response to inquiries relating to a conviction of 
crime, as though the conviction never occurred. 
Chambers at 878 (emphasis added). 
I£ an offender must always respond to inquiries pertaini 
to his convictions, how can respondents contend that the purpo: 
of the statute is to return Mr. Noren "to his status quo ante?" 
Appellant suggests that a difference does exist between 
the complete erasure and obliteration of an event and a mere cc 
celling, revoking, or setting aside. This difference is high-
lighted by the effect that each action has. 
An erasure of an event would remove and, for practical 
purposes, render it nonexistent. In this context, (l) an ex-fE 
could respond in the negative to any inquiry as to prior con~c 
tions; (2) no party could testify as to his prior conviction;' 
(3) no record would exist for public inspection. On the other 
hand, a revocation, cancellation or setting aside does not re~ 
- 4 -
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the court-created and evidence-sustained record. The written 
record still exists and will always exist until erased by court 
order. There was no court-ordered erasure in the instant case. 
In this context, an ex-felon with his record cancelled, set aside, 
or revoked, (1) does not have the privilege of denying prior con-
victions; (2) other people with direct knowledge of the crimes 
and convictions may reveal their knowledge; and (3) the record of 
conviction is always open to public inspection at the appropriate 
court clerk's office. It is this latter effect which Justice 
Maughn attributed to §77-35-17: "Proceeding under this statute 
the court cannot seal the record, restrict its inspection, nor 
. allow a response to inquiries relating to a conviction of 
crime, as though such conviction had never occurred." Chambers, 
supra. 
The realities of the instant case reveal that Mr. Noren 
proceeded under §77-35-17, and had his conviction set aside, but 
has never received a court order allowing him to deny prior con-
victions, nor has there ever been a court order "sealing" his 
record and effectively removing it from public knowledge and 
inspection. The current status of }tr. Noren's prior convictions 
is that they are to this day unsealed, unerased, and available 
:or public inspection through an inquiry at the clerk's office 
of the Fifth Circuit Court at the Metropolitan Hall of Justice. 
Appellant draws the court's attention to yet another argu-
r:c:t v:hich appears in respondents' brief, but which differs from 
~:c::>ellant's understanding of what this court has said in Chambers. 
- 5 -
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Respondents use the following language: 
[A]lthough the respondent herein, after 
the expunging of his convictions under §77-35-17, 
may not answer as he could under §77-35-17.5 that 
he had never been convicted of the offenses in 
question, he could nevertheless answer truthfully, 
that although he had been convicted of the offenses, 
that the convicting court had set aside the con-
viction, had dismissed the action and had discharged 
him and that therefore his conviction(s) do not now 
exist. Respondents' brief at p.6 (emphasis added). 
Appellant disagrees with the respondents' view that "theF 
fore his conviction{s) do not now exist." To so proclaim is~ 
deny the direct language, and intended operation of §77-35-17,, 
defined by this court in Chambers and as earlier discussed in 
appellant's brief, supra. Appellant submits that when §77-35-1-
dismisses, revokes, or sets aside, it is not the conviction itse. 
but, rather, ~~e effect of the conviction, or the sentence and 
penalties involved therewith which are dismissed, revoked, or sE· 
aside. Appellant further submits that if as discussed, supra, t' 
record of convictions is ~ever sealed, erased, or obliterated,' 
each conviction will always be noted on the public records. T~ 
effect of §77-35-17 is merely one of waiving or staying the re~ 
of any sentence which was imposed by the court following a con-
viction. This benefit usually comes to a party when the con-
viction is a first conviction and the conduct was not so egregic 
that society needs to invoke some stricter form of retribution. 
In these cases, completing a successful period of probation in 
which no further convictions have occurred will be sufficient 
invoke §77-35-17 and waive the remainder of the sentence. 
- 6 -
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This distinction draws support from two separate sources. 
First, the legislative titles of the two acts (§§77-35-17 and 
77-35-17.5) are entirely different and suggest separate public 
policies, the latter being entitled, "Expungement of court records," 
and the former entitled, "Suspension of sentence-Probation-Condi-
tions of probation-Power of court to dismiss or discharge de-
fendant-Exceptions." 
The title of §77-35-17 indicates that the legislature 
intended that the public policy to be attained by §77-35-17 is to 
allow it to operate by staying the effects of a sentence, but not 
of the conviction itself. Whereas, the public policy intended by 
the legislature to be attained under §77-35-17.5 is to free the 
offender from future public dissemination of his conviction by 
sealing all records pertaining thereto, and freeing him, thereby, 
of all effects of the conviction. 
Appellant recognizes that the court will usually refrain 
from considering the titles to Acts when asked to interpret a 
statute, but appellant also recognizes that certain exceptions 
are made to this practice when a certain degree of uncertainty 
exists. Appellant suggests the instant case contains this re-
quisite degree of uncertainty as explained in Great Salt Lake 
Authority v. Island Ranching, 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963, Rehearinq, 
18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 504 (1966), wher~ the court stated: 
We are aware that in many decisions, in-
cludina our own, it has been stated that the title is 
not pa;t of the act. This is true in the sense that 
it is not integrated into the operatlng portlon of 
the legislation; and that it will not be permltted 
to contradict or defeat a plainly expressed lntent; 
- 7 -
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nor can it be used to create an aQbiguity or uncer-
tainty when the language of the body of the act is 
clear. But where such clarity is lacking it is 
permissable to look to the title of the enactment 
to shed light on and clarify the meaning. 414 P.2d 
at 964-965 (emphasis added). (See also, Donahue v. 
Warner Bros., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954); 
Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967); 
American Smelting v. Utah State Tax Commission, 16 
Utah 2d 147, 397 P.2d 67 (1966).) 
If the court feels there is great ambiguity in the statut-
it may find the titles helpful. Second, futher support is fo~d 
in the two California cases cited in appellant's original brief 
hereinbefore filed with this court (In Re Phillips, 17 Cal.2d 
55, 109 P.2d 344 (1941) and Meyer v. Board of Medical Examinen, 
34 Cal.2d 62, 206 P.2d 1085 (1949)). In both cases, the peti· 
tioners had been convicted of a criminal statute and sentenced, 
but the execution of part of the sentences was suspended penilim 
payment of fines and/or certain periods of probation. In both 
cases, petitioners complied with their probation conditions (or 
were still in the process of so doing) and petitioned their 
respective courts to relieve them of further effects of the 
sentence and probation. In Phillips, the court set "aside the 
verdict of guilty and dismissed the accusation." at 345. In 
!1eyer, the court "ordered that his "probation be terminated anc 
he be discharged therefrom . at 1086. Following these 
judicial ilctions, both petitioners filed to remove the profess! 
disbarments which had been based upon their prior convictions. 
On appeal, the California Supreme Court refused to regrant the:: 
professional licenses stating that the "setting aside" or "dis· 
charge" only stayed the execution of the sentences and did not 
- 8 -
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remove the actual convictions. The court in Phillips is especially 
clear in outlining the distinction between §§77-35-17 and 77-35-17.5 
alluded to by the appellant, supra: 
It is contended that the order granting 
probation followed by an order dismissing the 
action.. is analogous to an order granting a 
new trlal or to the reversal of a judgment of con-
viction upon appeal, and that a judgment of con-
viction cannot be final so long as the court can 
set it aside by any of these methods. But we do 
not believe that the power granted to the trial 
court can be given this effect . No such 
considerations are present in the granting of 
probation to a convicted defendant. Whether the 
court suspends the rendition of the judgment of 
conviction or whether it merely suspends the 
execution of the judgment, the order of probation 
presupposes that the defendant is guilty. 
109 P.2d at 347 (emphasis added). 
It is important to note that the statutes involved in 
Phillips and Meyer are sinilar to §77-35-17, which is being con-
sidered in the instant case. 
Not only do these cases stand for the proposition that it 
is only the execution of the sentence and not the conviction itself 
which is waived but, they also stand for the proposition that pro-
fessional licensing boards may still consider the conviction, even 
2£ter a "discharge" or setting aside: 
The powers possessed by the trial courts 
under the Probation statutes . . are concerned 
with mitigation of punishment .... The power of 
the court to reward a convicted defendant who 
satisfactorily completes his period of p7obation 
by settina aside the verd1ct and dlsmlsslng the 
action operates to mitioate his pu~ishment by 
restoring certain rights and remov1ng certaln 
disabilities. But it cannot be assumed that the 
legislature intended that such action by the . 
trial court ... should be consldered as oblltera-
ting the fact that the defend2nt had been finally 
- 9 -
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adjudged auilty of a crime . In brief, 
action in mltigation of the defendant's punishment 
should not affect the fact that his guilt as been 
finally determined accordinq to law. Such a final 
determination of guilt is the basis for the order 
of disbarment in this case. That final judgment 
of conviction is a fact; and its effect cannot be 
nullified for the purpose here involved, either by 
order of probation or by the later order dismissing 
the action after judgment. 109 P.2d at 347 48 
(emphasis added (see also Meyer at 1087). 
The effect of this is shown by the difference between PrE· 
conviction and post-conviction acquittals or dismissals. A dis-
missal or acquittal made prior to conviction reflects the fact 
that the prosecution has failed to meet its burden of proof and 
either withdrew the complaint prior to trial or received a verdic: 
of not guilty from the triers of fact at trial. On the other hanc 
a post-convictlon acquittal or dismissal is the type referred ~ 
in Phillips and Meyer and which is present in the instant case. 
The effect of such an action would be to "mitigate" the offende'' 
"punishment." But, it should not be interpreted as "obliterating 
the fact that the defendant had been finally adjudged guilty ofo 
crime." It was on this basis that the Phillips court felt it 
could not restore the professional license sought. Appellant sugc 
the facts of this case require similar treatment on the same bas: 
This result is all the more demanded where professional 
licenses are concerned because the very character of the party 
involved is called into question, and where the offender was co:: 
victed of violating the very act which he will be called upon ~ 
enforce if a license is granted, then the character of the appl: 
is very relevant to the applicant's fitness for the particular 
- 10 -
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license applied for and should be admissable at any stage of any 
proceeding where the character of the applicant and the propriety 
of issuing the license are in question. To this same effect were 
this court's guidelines in State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351,64 P.2d 
229 (1936): 
The following principles, . are here 
enumerated for the guidance of the bench and bar: 
* * * * 
(2) Any witness may be asked a question 
the answer to which has a direct tendency to degrade 
his or her character if it is pertinent to establish 
the ultimate fact in issue or to a fact from which 
such fact may be presumed or inferred. 
64 P.2d at 238 (emphasis added). 
And in the Utah Judicial Code, §78-24-9: 
A witness must answer questions legal and 
pertinent to the matter in issue, ... but he need 
not give an answer . . which will have a direct 
tendency to degrade his character, unless it is to 
the very fact in issue or to a fact from which the 
fact in issue would be presumed. (Emphasis added.) 
In this regard, it is important to note that one of the 
main inquiries required of the Motor Vehicle Licensing Board, as 
directed by the Motor Vehicle Code, is to ascertain and consider 
the fitness of all applicants for dealership licenses. Utah Code 
Ann. §§41-3-8 and 41-3-26. This calls into question the applicant's 
character and requires him to reveal whether he has ever been con-
victed of a crime under the act which he may be required to enforce. 
Respondents have attempted to distinguish Phillips and 
~1eyer and to discount appellant's analysis by claiming that, (1) 
the statutes involved in those cases were "probation" statutes 
c.r.d not "expungement" statutes; (2) California now has a different 
- 11 -
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statute than that which was litigated in Phillips and Meyer; ana 
(3) Loder v. Municipal Court for S.D. Judicial District, 17 CaL 
859, 553 P.2d 624 (1976), holds to the opposi-::.e effect of these 
cases. 
First, appellant agrees that the statutes involved in~ 
and Phillips were probationary in nature, but the important thir. 
to note is that these statutes are worded very similarly to Ut~ 
§77-35-17, making it also probationary in nature. This would 
likewise appear to have been the intended legislative effect of 
the statute based upon that section's title. Appellant submits 
that Utah's statute should be read as a Meyer- Phillips type 
statute. 
Second, the fact that California has enacted new legisla: 
which has repealed the statutes under which Meyer and Phillips 
were decided does not destroy the usefulness of these cases it 
deciding the proper interpretation of similar legislation. %e 
Nevada Supreme Court found both cases helpful in deciding ~ 
v. Nevada State Board of Accountancy, 93 Nev. 548, 571 P.2d 105 
(1977), where the Nevada Supreme court cited both Phillips and 
~ as authority in holding that business and professional 
licenses may be withheld on the basis of prior convictions, eve· 
though the verdict has been "set aside" and "dismissed," folloh 
u "satisfactory completion of probation." 571 P.2d at 106. 
Finally, appellant submits that respondents' reliance~ 
Loder is misplaced here because that case dealt with expungem~ 
of arrest records of individuals, v;hich arrests never proceedes 
trial or conviction. The court allowed these records to be 
- 12 -
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destroyed. Respondents' citation of that court's remarks directed 
at expungement of convictions was only dicta, which the same court 
followed with these directive remarks: 
Indeed, even a conviction can no longer 
support a denial or revocation of a license unless 
the crime is "substantially related to the qualifca 
tions, functions or duties of the business or pro 
fession in question. 553 P.2d at 635 (emphasis added). 
The instant case is easily distinguishable because, as 
noted in Phillips the "final judgment of conviction is a fact; and 
its effects cannot be nullified for the purpose here involved,either 
by order of probation or by the later order dismissing the action 
after judgment." 109 P.2d at 349. 
There is no reason to keep a record where there has been 
only an arrest and no conviction, as in Loder, but there is ample 
reason where a conviction resulted and sentence imposed. 
Appellant suggests that following the rule established in 
~, Phillips and Patt, the fact that a party seeking a pro-
fessional or business license has had his conviction set aside or 
dismissed should not affect a court or an administrative agency 
from weighing that conviction, especially when the conviction 
relates directly to the license applied for. Where the offender's 
record is not sealed, is open to public inspection, and where 
the offender himself must acknowledge his convictions when con-
fronted, the court or agency must be able to consider this in-
fornation in making a "fitness" determination. 
- 13 - j 
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY HEARING 
THIS ~ffiTTER COMPLETELY DE NOVO, BY 
EXCLUDI"G RESPONDENTS' PRIOR CONVIC-
TIONS, AND BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE 
RECORD CREATED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCY. 
Appellant asserts that although the statute under which 
respondents filed their appeal to the Third District Court is 
arabi guo us and not de fined explicitly through case law, the inter· 
pretation selected by the Third District Court was the least 
desirable and least applicable of all possible interpretations. 
Appellant suggests that there are at least three inter-
pretations more viable than that selected, below, which encompas' 
a "review" type of appeal which appellant believes is mandated. 
(See appellant's reply brief at 17.) 
Respondents cite State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.~ 
1034 (1941) and Hakki v. Faux, 16 Utah 2d 132, 396 P.2d 876 (19f· 
for the proposition that the "original action" required in Utar. 
Code Ann. §41-3-27, is synonomous with the invoking of the ori~ 
jurisdiction of the district court. Appellant disputes this r~ 
ing of these cases as being too cursory and distinguishable hm 
the instant setting. 
First, we are dealing with a proce<?ding commenced in an 
administrative agency as opposed to one commenced in a lower 
judicial tribunal. The legislature created these agencies and 
granted them quasi-judic1al powers in order to create a body 1:: 
expertise in the particular area and to avoid overburdening ti,, 
courts with nonjudicial functions like licensing. Therefore,: 
attempt to compare Johnsen and Fa u~: vii th ,_·,e i:-~stant case fa'-
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short because this court was not confronted in either case with 
an "appeal" to the district court from a lower tribunal, nor did 
they grapple with the state of the law when the facts were first 
disputed at an administrative agency and then brought to the 
district court. 
Secondly, this case may be distinguished by the very language 
and authority used in Johnson. There, citing In Re Peterson's 
Estate, 22 N.D. 480, 134 N.W. 751 (1912) at 763, it is suggested 
that the legislature nay grant reviewing courts whatever power it 
wishes, including some incidences of original jurisdiction: 
The Legislature may require the appellate 
court to review the facts and render final judgment. 
If in so doing it exercise [sic] some of the func-
tions of a court of original jurisdiction, we answer 
that there is neither constitutional nor legal 
reason why it should not. 114 P.2d at 1037. 
In this regard, appellant suggests that for the Third 
District Court to have original jurisdiction over this licensing 
action, as submitted by respondents, then that court must have the 
power to have originally heard the action without following the 
administrative procedure created by statute. In essence, what 
respondents are contending is that the administrative agency is 
similar to the old city court which was a court of limited juris-
diction, wherein any action commenced in that court could have 
been equally commenced in the district court. Appellant contends 
t~at this is a strained interpretation because the legislature 
~as granted the licensing power, not to the courts, but to its 
statutorily created adninistrative agencies. These agencies are 
created as experts in their particular areas and are not similar 
- 15 -
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to the city court system in this respect at all. Unless applic~ 
tion is made to an administrative agency and a hearing is held an 
a record and decision entered, the district court may not enter 
the field and become a licensing body. Application may not 
originally be made Lo the Third District Court to bypass the 
administrative process. (See, in this regard, Point II of appel-
lant's original brief, especially the discussion of U.S. v. Distr 
Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 P.2d 1132 (1951), and Peterson v. Livestoc 
Commission, 120 Mont. 140, 181 P.2d 152 (1947) at pp. 9-14, 
Appellant's Brief.) Therefore, the contention that original act: 
means precisely the same as original jurisdiction as expressed ii 
Johnson and Faux is unfounded. 
Appellant asserts that the legislature's choice of words 
has determined that the courts are not to become licensing bodie: 
They are to function as reviewers of the agency's actions on 
11 appeal. 11 If anything but some form of review on the record was 
intended by the legislature, then there would have been no need 
to create such an elaborate process whereby judicial powers are 
granted and a record created. (See appellant's discussion of 
this point in relation to Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public Servic 
Cornrn., 98 Utah 431, 100 P.2d 552 (1940), and Denver & R.G.W.R. ( 
v. Central Weber Sevier Improvement District, 4 Utah 2d 105, 28: 
P.2d 884 (1955) at pp. 14-16 of appellant's original brief.) 
Appellant submits that the legislature created a requirement of 
an appeal bond in a licensing case because it intended the dist: 
court to review the administrator's decision. The filing of~ 
original action was merely a means of invoking the jurisdictior 
of the district court. 
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Appellant suggests that the three most logical interpreta-
tions which could be given to the "appeal and original action" 
requirement of Utah Code Ann. §41-3-26 are: The district court 
should have (1) considered the case as a review of an administra-
tive agency, applying the applicable standards of review; (2) held 
a trial de novo in which the administrative agency's hearing 
record was considered and additional evidence taken; and {3) sat 
as the administrative agency applying the law appropriate thereto, 
and sitting in a pure de novo hearing as the administrator. 
Under any of these applications of the statute, the prior 
convictions are admissible evidence and the mere setting aside 
thereof could not operate so as to make them inadmissible in this 
particular administrative setting. Since the convictions are 
admissible, the trial court committed error when it failed to 
follow the specific mandate of Utah Code Ann. §41-3-8 and refuse 
to issue a motor vehicle dealer's license because an applicant had 
been convicted in a court of record of a violation of the Motor 
Vehicle Dealers' Act. 
In short, Mr. Noren has been convicted of such a violation 
and only an expungement under Utah Code Ann. §77-35-17.5 can ever 
alter that fact. In the absence of such an expungement, §41-3-8 
calls for a denial of a license. 
DATED this / sr- day of }lay, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
111aJit;~· 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Reply Brief of Respondent-Appellant, postage prepaid, to David M.· 
Bown, Attorney for Petitioner-Respondent, 3007 South West Temple, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84115 on this ~day of 11ay, 1980. 
- 17 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
